Paris appears to be reviewing its presidential plan in Lebanon after its failure and attempting to join the policies of Riyadh and Washington, which still hold the first square in identifying the crisis and defining the specifications of the presidential battle and future president.
The issue seems serious between the escalating internal indicators with intensity and external attempts to contain the Lebanese tension through conducting the presidential elections.
This article was initially published in, translated from the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar.
However, the bare ceiling that still controls the course of external efforts is to push Lebanon to accomplish the presidential entitlement. This is tied to arranging the financial situation with the availability of essential elements in order to cut off the time of international escalation, and it is not only the war in Ukraine that is referred to but also the Iranian nuclear file and the Israeli stance towards it while waiting for long-term solutions.
Since the Saudi-Iranian agreement, there have been attempts to understand it in a Lebanese context through hints and scenarios related to ways of implementing it on the Lebanese scene.
The efforts in this field are contradictory, depending on the identity of the political forces, whether allied with Saudi Arabia or Iran.
In contrast, weird facts tend to deal with it according to different standards related to China's role and the influential oil factor in the relationship with Saudi Arabia, the importance of Yemen's position in the agreement, and the practical steps expected to be translated during the next two months. Despite its current confusion, Israel's view of Iran's nuclear issue and Saudi Arabia's role in the region is heading toward practical steps in politics, security, and economy.
Hence, the Western trend, primarily American, is escalating in reading the agreement realistically without jumping over the American offices already familiar with its different aspects. This realism obliges Lebanon to deal with regional negotiations to the extent of their importance to the countries concerned.
For Lebanon, the issue needs checking of the American, French, and Saudi data, not regarding the regional agreement, in its direct sense. Still, the interpretations are given to the actual direction of the policies of the three capitals towards Lebanon, before and after the agreement, based on the presidential elections.
It is difficult for Lebanese political forces to be convinced that the fifth session in Paris was a fundamental turning point reflected first in Paris before Beirut. This had nothing to do with the agreement that Saudi Arabia was preparing for with the knowledge of Washington. Paris quickly jumped over political conclusions in Beirut and Paris in parallel, leading it to a dead end, and reflected on the Elysee team gradually in attempts to contain the negative aspects of the fifth session in terms of false expectations, followed by clarifications.
Hence, French President Emmanuel Macron's call to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman came to reflect a new conclusion in France's policy built on the conviction of mistakes committed and violations in imposing and drawing scenarios that were not based on factual operations, which neither Saudi Arabia nor Washington agreed upon.
Although it is not the first time that Paris has tried to show that it is following Saudi Arabia and its policy in Lebanon, amid Elysee's engagement in France's severe internal problems, the past few weeks have demonstrated the extent of the failure of the presidential strategy in approaching the issue of the Lebanese presidency, which necessitated a different approach and an attempt to contain the French stumble, and once again to seek to get closer to Riyadh and keep up with its policy in Lebanon.
The US diplomat Barbara Leaf's visit to Lebanon, highlighted the different approaches of Paris and Washington toward the Lebanese political and presidential crises.
Washington has kept its stance on the issue and has yet to make any commitments to its allies, and this has led to a decrease in support from its traditional partners, unlike Paris. The US is waiting for more time to crystallize its stance. However, it has nothing yet to offer to the "opposition" forces and its traditional allies, and it cannot make commitments and promises that it cannot fulfill soon. This is one of the main reasons for reducing the manifestations of alignment with its allies.
Meanwhile, it continues to support Saudi Arabia's position on the Lebanese situation. Both the US and Saudi Arabia encourage the holding of Lebanese elections as the internal situation in Lebanon is not tolerable anymore. However, Paris is trying to impose a partial settlement from above. The US and Saudi Arabia believe that the Lebanese have a real opportunity to hold local elections that could help stop the current economic and social crisis. The Saudi umbrella may provide the necessary support for this to happen.
Moreover, politicians aware of American stances speak of a significant shift in the approach of major countries, taking into account political forces. Paris appears to be considerate of the Shiia duo, while Saudi Arabia is taking into consideration the Christian opposition forces in the majority in the absence of the Sunni role.
Meanwhile, Washington is waiting for more time to develop a decisive approach to dealing with Lebanon. At the same time, it confirms its harmony with the Saudi position in understanding the Lebanese situation and ways to address it.
The stance remains unchanged, and the regional agreements have not changed it at all. However, there are wishes among the opposition and some of its main forces that the agreement would reduce the intensity of the presidential division. This means an agreement between the opposition and the duo on a consensus that facilitates the presidential elections. Americans and Saudis are urging for Lebanese elections because "the internal situation in Lebanon can no longer tolerate more tensions and fears of a social explosion."
Recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s warning is one of the most prominent international indicators.
Furthermore, this concern did not change Saudi Arabia's approach in attempts to impose purely French harmony towards a presidential and governmental settlement. Paris realized this after a delay that contributed to deepening the internal crisis. Anyone related to its stance speaks of new variables in the approach to the presidential file and the relationship with Saudi Arabia, especially after the failure of the fifth session. The same goes for Washington, which, although it has preferred candidates with Saudi Arabia, is now retreating from direct naming before the region's conditions develop from Israel to Iran to reach a significant settlement. This is unlike the hasty French adventure in imposing a partial settlement from above.
However, both parties still consider Lebanon a real opportunity to hold local elections according to well-thought-out rules that contribute to stopping the current economic and social situation. It then may be granted the required Saudi-Arab and international shield.