In recent weeks, there have been discussions among prominent leaders in Hezbollah regarding the approach of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his team. Additionally, there has been scrutiny of the potential positive developments with Iran, spanning from Riyadh to a broader region, including Beirut, which cannot stand in the way of this transition.
According to analysts, after two years of confrontation, Saudi Arabia has recognized that it cannot resolve its conflicts in the disputed regions with Iran without first resolving the issues with Iran itself.
Therefore, Riyadh has recently agreed to reconcile with Tehran, allowing for a new understanding between the allies of both Iran and Saudi Arabia in the region. Iranian diplomats visiting Beirut recently confirmed that Riyadh was the one who hastened its efforts with China and requested the announcement of the agreement.
This shift comes as Iran is reassured that Saudi Arabia's economic and financial ambitions outweigh its expansionist political ones and that Riyadh is approaching the region's issues based on partnership rather than individuality. If Saudi Arabia moves away from excluding certain factions and instead uses its veto power only on specific individuals, it could represent a major breakthrough in Lebanon, allowing elected allies to participate in governance.
It is worth noting here that Saudi diplomacy's adherence to the principle of "no winner, no loser" at the level of the presidency, government, and the Cabinet itself, represents a significant shift from Saudi Arabia's previous stance based on the principle of "all or nothing."
In this context, the Saudi ambassador, Walid Bukhari, insisted on mentioning the Lebanese Forces in the statement issued after his last visit to Maarab that the desired candidate is a "reformist sovereign president from outside the factions," which contradicts the Lebanese Forces' preference for a "reformist sovereign president" only. The phrase "from outside the factions" is not insignificant but rather a direct correction of the Lebanese Forces' candidate, MP Michel Moawad, and other political candidates.
A source familiar with this detail confirms that the candidate "from outside the factions" for Saudi Arabia today is Army Commander General Joseph Aoun. Still, it could also include other economic candidates rather than military ones.
Bukhari, who returned from Saudi Arabia, informed both Samir Geagea and MP Sami Gemayel that "the Saudi-Iranian agreement is very serious and will have an impact on both Bahrain and Yemen, but will have less impact on Iraq due to the strong American presence and Riyadh's reluctance to provoke the Americans."
Meanwhile, coinciding with the visit of US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf to Beirut, it can be said that Aoukar has intensified its political movement in more than one direction, after the Iranian-Saudi meeting.
The discussions indicate that Americans are sending signals of changes in their perception of the presidential file. However, it has not been confirmed yet whether this is just a ‘maneuver’ in response to French attempts, or whether Washington has decided to modify its strategy. Two fundamental observations arise here:
Firstly, expressing extreme frustration with the overall French approach to the Lebanese file. The French were supposed to persuade Hezbollah diplomatically to take what the Americans could not take in war. Still, the party seems to be trying to convince the French and peacefully take what it failed to bring in war.
Additionally, US sources point out that the French did the same in 2005 when they stopped all popular, political, and media momentum and dashed all aspirations and dreams of being discharged from the Quartet agreement, which cannot be repeated.
It is certain that the US fully intersects with Saudi Arabia in "limiting the French role" and cutting off what one of the diplomats describes as prioritizing Total's interests at the expense of the strategic political interests of both the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Secondly, surpassing the principle of specifications that the US administration insists on in its official statements and directly enters into "name suggestions" by blending opinions. US employees repeat the question about two specific names, the director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jihad Azour, and former minister Ziad Baroud, adding a name here and there, depending on their host's identity.
Recently, it has been noticeable that Ambassador Dorothy Shea repeatedly criticized the Army Commander. Despite linking the matter to a personal decision, it seems that the Americans' lack of enthusiasm for the Army Commander goes beyond the principle of maneuvering with the conviction that it is best for him to stay in Yarze, where he plays a crucial role for them. Electing Azour or Baroud as president does not solely hold them responsible for the era's failure if it falls later.
If Azour and Baroud represent a fundamental intersection between the Americans, the Maronite Patriarchate, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), former MP Walid Jumblatt, and Lebanese Forces, then the American enthusiasm for Azour is economically, financially, legally, and constitutional for Baroud.
However, it is worth noting that both men are under heavy fire from those directly affected by this new "atmosphere." If the current is open to positive discussion about Azour and Baroud without lending a hasty position, the Lebanese Forces will avoid any public comment on both of them, but they informed Archbishop Antoine Bou Najem that they would not go for Azour under any circumstances.
In this context, indeed, the expected frigidity regarding the presidential file during Ramadan was absent this time, as the country witnessed a week ago what it has yet to see since the end of President Michel Aoun's term. All that is happening is the arrangement of each team's papers while waiting for negotiations that those directly involved in the Saudi-Iranian agreement say cannot be held before at least two months.